Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: A Case of Imperfect Substitution

韩晗，北京大学经济学院长聘副教授（正高级）、研究员、国家社科重大项目首席专家，主要研究领域为宏观经济、银行、金融市场、金融支付、电子货币、新闻的金融效应等。他的多篇研究发表在Journal of Economic Theory、International Economic Review、European Economic Review、Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance、《光明日报》《经济日报》等著名刊物上，撰写的研究报告多次获上级采用和批示，获得良好的社会效益。并荣获北京市第十六届哲学社会科学优秀成果奖，北京高校“优质本科教材课件”等奖项。

This paper studies the effect of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on bank intermediation when the CBDC is an imperfect substitute to bank deposits and the deposit market is imperfectly competitive. We show that a CBDC can promote bank intermediation and output if the CBDC rate is in some intermediate range. A CBDC that is a better substitute has larger positive effects. It can raise lending and output by more. It starts to increase lending and output at a lower interest rate and it promotes intermediation and output for a wider range of interest rates. Therefore, to better reap the benefit of a CBDC, it should be designed as a close substitute to bank deposits.