Rationalizable Stability in Matching with One-Sided Incomplete Information-葡萄牙vs塞尔维亚比赛直播 经济学院统计学与数据科学系

Rationalizable Stability in Matching with One-Sided Incomplete Information

主讲人:Ziwei Wang

Ziwei Wang is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Wuhan University. He obtained his PhD from the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 2022. His research focuses on game theory, matching theory, and information economics. He has published an article on Social Choice and Welfare, and is actively refereeing for economics journals such as GEB, JEBO, JET, and REDesign.

主持人:Qiaoxi Zhang

This paper proposes a new notion of stability to study matching markets with one-sided incomplete information. A key contribution is to formulate a proper definition of uninformed agents' endogenous beliefs and a self-consistency condition on those beliefs. We define a criterion of stability for a given set of outcomes, and then iteratively apply this criterion to remove outcomes that cannot be deemed stable. Our solution concept, the set of rationalizable stable outcomes, is the limit of this procedure. We prove the existence of rationalizable stable outcomes using a fixed-point characterization. We then provide two additional characterizations of our solution concept. The first characterization links the non-equilibrium approach we pursue to the equilibrium approach pioneered by Liu (2020). The second one reveals the epistemic assumptions implicit in the iterative definition.

时间:2023-09-21 (Thursday) 16:40-18:00
地点:Room N302, Economics Building
主办单位:葡萄牙vs塞尔维亚比赛直播 经济学院、王亚南经济研究院、邹至庄经济研究院
承办单位:葡萄牙vs塞尔维亚比赛直播 经济学院、王亚南经济研究院、邹至庄经济研究院